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BOOK REVIEW

"BUT

I KNOW IT WHEN

I SEE IT":

NATURAL LAW AND FORMALISM
W. H. Bryson *
NATURAL LAW IN COURT: A HISTORY OF LEGAL THEORY IN PRACTICE
By R. H. Helmholz. Harvard University Press, 2015. 260 pp. $45.00
LAW'S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC
TURN TO HISTORY
By David M. Rabban. Cambridge University Press, 2013. 582 pp. $33.99

Professor Helmholz writes with knowledge and authority on
the use of natural law in the courts of law in early modern Europe, England, and the United States. This necessarily includes a
discussion of the teaching of natural law to the students who
would in due course practice in those courts and sit on those
benches.' It is apparent that natural law was not taught in the
schools of law systematically, as it was in the schools of philosophy and theology. Rather, it was peripherally introduced at the
beginning of a student's legal education in order to anchor the
law and the study thereof in the broader world.2 This is logically
necessary when the theoretical law is applied to the facts of the
so called "real world." The law may or may not be a metaphysical
construct, but it certainly does concern itself with the world as a
method-the preferred method--of conflict resolution.
*

Blackstone Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. LL.D., 2013,

University of Cambridge; Ph.D., 1972, University of Cambridge; LL.M., 1968, University
of Virginia School of Law; LL.B., 1967, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1963, Hampden-Sydney
College.
1. R.H. HELMHOLZ, NATURAL LAW IN COURT: A HISTORY OF LEGAL THEORY IN
PRACTICE 13-40, 82-93, 127-41 (2015).
2. Id. at 17, 89-90, 133-34.

108

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 50:107

Professor Helmholz shows convincingly that natural law ideas
were in the backs of the minds of the legal professionals in the
early modern period of Europe and the western hemisphere. Other sources of the law were more often resorted to, but that was
because positive and municipal law were more explicit and better
defined.
Professor Rabban focuses on legal education and legal thought
in the late nineteenth century. He discusses, in particular, the legal accomplishments of the Harvard Law School under Dean C.
C. Langdell and his immediate colleagues and followers.3 These
accomplishments were, in my own opinion, primarily in the arena
of legal scholarship. The Harvard Law School professors wrote
legal treatises that were useful not only to their students but
more importantly to the Anglo-American legal profession in general.4
Professor Rabban's careful and thorough study of these men
and their work places them in the broader tradition of natural
law. They were called formalists, but, it appears to me that formalism is simply the putting of the natural law into legal practice. Thus, natural law is the organizing principle underlying
their legal treatises.
The burden of this book is to demonstrate that the nineteenth
century formalists were not at all the tools of the contemporary
industrialists. They most certainly did not champion the ideas of
unbridled laissez faire capitalism that was the economic model at
their time, although they were unfairly characterized as doing so
by their successors, Dean Roscoe Pound and his followers.5 It is,
of course, human nature to push the older generation out of the
way so that the younger generation can take their place. This is
perhaps necessary if any progress is to be made. Challenging older ideas is a good thing if it is done honestly. But mindlessly to
cast aside the tried and true is not a good thing. Not all change is
progress. History supplies many unfortunate examples of major
steps backward. Professor Rabban corrects the misperceptions by
the so-called legal realists as to the positions of the legal formalists.
3. DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW'S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND THE
TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 325-80 (2013).
4. See, e.g., C.C. LANGDELL, A BRIEF SURVEY OF EQUITY JURISDICTION (1905); C. C.
LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING (1877); AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS (1939); JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT
THE COMMON LAW (1898); SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1920).
5. RABBAN, supra note 3, at 423-30, 474-77.
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Justice Stewart, in the case of Jacobellis v. Ohio,6 as to pornography, while he could not define it clearly, observed, "[b]ut I know
it when I see it." Perhaps it is not appropriate to speak of pornography and divine law in the same article, but this quotation does
have the ring of truth to those who have the grace to believe in
something without fully understanding it.
Both Professor Helmholz and Professor Rabban know what
natural law and formalism are. However, neither scholar presumes to give an airtight definition. And this is appropriate. Professor Helmholz ends his book with a quotation from Thomas
Aquinas, who, with humility, acknowledges his own imperfect
understanding of natural law.'
Perhaps natural law is God's law. If so, human beings cannot
fully know it, since creatures cannot fully know their creator. I
am neither a theologian nor a philosopher, nor will I attempt a
definition of natural law. However, I will observe that those wiser
than me have opposed natural law to the general law of nations
and the municipal law of a specific nation. Thus natural law has
been opposed to the positive law. This, however, is not to say they
are always in conflict. Perhaps, in the ideal world, they coincide.
We can let the philosophers argue about the "ought" and the "is."
We can let the legal realists carry the ideas of Jeremy Bentham
about the positive law to extremes. We can let the theologians
and the atheists argue over whether there is nothing outside of
human existence. However, before Bentham, lawyers did not
think that way. Before Bentham all lawyers believed that there
was something above human being and experience, and this was
and is natural law. It is something that defines the goodness of
the positive law. Exactly what that is, I do not know. But I know
it when I see it.
What is law, anyway? It is a body of principles that governs.
The opposite of law is anarchy, where the strong devour the
weak. The "law of the jungle" is not law, but power. So the powerful make law to serve their own power, but disguise power as law.
This is positive law, both case law and statute law. It is the power
of the sovereign, however one might define the term sovereign.
Under positive law, it is lawful for the powerful to oppress the

6. 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
7. HELMHOLZ, supra note 1, at 178 (paraphrasing Thomas Aquinas's assertion that
"the more one descended into details and consequences, the more qualifications one was
forced to admit"). We might further paraphrase Aquinas as "the devil is in the details."
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weak and for the big fish to eat the little fish. But we have a
sense of right and wrong which is different sometimes from the
positive law. This sense of right is a knowledge of natural law.
Those without a conscience-sociopaths-do not see natural law.
And even though I cannot define natural law in its breadth or in
its details, I know it when I see it. The research and scholarship
of Professor Helmholz and Professor Rabban are affirmative steps
in the clarification of this subject. They, too, know it when they
see it.
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